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PREFACE 
The CAPSjAERU Marketing Study Group consisted of Professor A.N. 
Rae of the Centre for Agricultural policy Studies, and Professor A.C. 
Zwart and Ms S.K. Martin of the Agricultural Economics Research Unit. 
It was established by the Economics Division, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries to address those marketing issues that were of concern in 
1985 and 1986. 
The Study Group acknowl edges the contri buti ons made to its 
deliberations by Dr S Durbin, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Dr 
W.R. Schroder of the Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Business, Massey University, and Dr P.L. Arcus, of Arcus Consultants 
Ltd, Vancouver, Canada. Dr Arcus was a Marketing Consultant to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in Wellington from February to 
June 1986. 
The detailed results of the Study Group's research have been 
reported in two publications. This Report, which is one of these 
publications, evaluates a contractual framework for the analysis of 
marketing issues. The other detailed publication to emerge from the 
Group's deliberations is: 
Rae, A.N., "Frameworks, Theories and Methods of Analysis of 
Marketing Channels: A Marketing Literature Review", 
Agricultural Policy Discussion Paper No.7, Centre for 
Agricultural Policy Studies, Massey University. July 1986. 
These two pUblications are summarised and integrated in a third 
document entitled: 
Martin, S.K., A.N. Rae and A.C. Zwart, "An Integrated Framework for 
Analysing Agricultural Marketing Issues". 
This is a joint publication available as: 
Research Report No. 179 
Agricultural Economics Research Unit 
L i nco 1 n College 
or as 
Discussion Paper No.9 
Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies 
iVlassey University 
(v i i) 
R.G. Lattimore 
DIRECTOR 

SECTION 1 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING ISSUES 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, new directions have begun to emerge in 
agricultural export marketing. Emphasis has been placed on managed 
marketing to target market segments, rather than on bulk commodity 
trading. This has resulted in an increasing focus on product and 
market devel.opment and concern exi sts as to whether the marketi ng 
structures which now exist most appropriately meet perceived industry 
needs in these areas. In addition, there is a greater awareness by 
Government that the granti ng of statutory ri ghts to a sector of an 
industry involves a redistribution of property rights, which has both 
efficiency and equity implications. 
In New Zealand, a variety of marketing arrangements have 
emerged to cope with the export marketing of New Zealand's primary 
products. At one end of the spectrum is a controll ed marketi ng 
structure typified by the dairying industry which has essentially 
existed in this form for over fifty years. At a lesser level of 
regulation are the statutory Boards which trade alongside existing 
marketing channels when they feel it is necessary. These include the 
wool industry and the meat industry prior to 1983. Other statutory 
options which partially regulate marketing activity are also in 
operation. In this case, an example would be a restriction on the 
number of private exporters who are licensed by statutory authority, as 
with kiwifruit. 
In addition to this wide variation in statutory marketing 
alternatives, there exist a number of unregulated structures. For 
example, in the barley industry, a voluntary producer co-operative 
operates alongside private exporting merchants. On the other hand, in 
newly-emerging export industries such as cut flowers, there is no 
collective organi sation of marketing activity by producers as a group, 
and a variety of export arrangements appear to exist between individual 
producers and their agents. 
Two broad issues emerge with respect to the range of marketing 
alternatives which are in operation. The first has a positive 
orientation, and addresses the questions of why alternative marketing 
structures evolve in different industries, and why different structures 
may emerge in the same industry at different periods in time. The 
second issue is of a more normative nature, and concerns the evaluation 
of these alternative marketing structures with respect to their 
performance. To some extent, the two questions are interrelated, since 
it may prove necessary to understand why structures have evolved in a 
certain way in order to evaluate factors i"fluencing their perfonnance. 
These two issues wi 11 now be di scussed ;)ri efly. 
1. 
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1.2 The Evolution of Mar~e~ing Channels 
From a cursory examination of the historical evolution of 
alternative marketing structures in New Zealand, it is not clear why 
different structures have emerged in different industries, despite a 
perceived stimulus to change which appears to be similar in a number of 
cases. For example some industries such as dairying and pipfruit 
adopted highly regulated marketing structures in response to low prices 
in the 1920·s. However, during the same period, other industries such 
as wool, which were initially regulated in response to perceived low 
prices, reverted to private enterprise marketing after international 
wool stockpiles had been cleared. In more recent years, the kiwifruit 
industry instituted licensing of exporters. This move was partially in 
response to the threat of oversupply and hence low threatened producer 
prices. On the other hand, barley producers responded to what appeared 
to be a similar stimulus on the surface (that is, perceived low prices) 
by forming a voluntary marketing co-operative which trades alongside 
existing channels. 
What appears to emerge from the above discussion is that the 
stimulus of act:Jdl) perceived or threatened low or uncertain prices may 
lead to some change in existing marketing arrangements in an industry. 
However, the reasons why different structures may then emerge appears 
to be more firmly embedded in the microeconomics of the situation. 
For example, perceived low prices in the kiwifruit industry 
were seen to arise from an oversupply of product, particularly of 
poorer quality fruit. Therefore, it was felt that greater 
industry-wide co-ordination of exports was necessary to arrest this 
threatened price decline. In the barley industry, on the other hand, 
growers perceived an inadequate link between the relatively low prices 
which they received from merchants and the higher world price for 
barley. This led to the formation of a producer co-operative, which 
can be envisaged as having the dual effect of providing growers with an 
alternative marketing channel, and of allowing them to use this new 
channel as a means of exercising countervailing power against existing 
merchants. In industries which were even less co-ordinated, price 
uncertainty resulted in changes in marketing options. For example, 
exporters of l"jnseed initially offered ~rowers a forward contract to 
induce them to produce a crop which was unfamiliar to them. However, 
when they were not able to realize these forward prices, they withdrew 
from further contracts of this nature, and operated as commission 
agents Of} behal f of growers. 
Therefore, while low or uncertain actual or perceived prices 
may be a catalyst for a change in marketing options, the form which 
such change might take is likely to vary according to the 
microenvironment in the industry. In order to !Jnderstand how marketirl:} 
channels might emerge, particularly in the case of new products, it 
would seem to be necessary to focus on linkages which are established 
between producers and their agents. 
The agricultural economics literature has explored some of the 
these issues to a limited extent. For example, a rationale for the 
existence of producer co-operatives is that they provide countervailing 
producer power to monopsonistic private merchants (Bat2man 1976; Le 
Vay, 1983). Similarly, authorities with statutory power are seen as 
3 
emerging from co-operatives as a means of avoiding 
problems associated with this latter type of agency 
Davies, 1960; Warley, 1967). 
the free- ri der 
(Bateman, 1976; 
Beyond tnis, degrees of statutory power which exist can be 
listed along a spectrum, with minimum market intervention activities 
such as research and promotion being at one end of the spectrum, and 
maximum market intervention activities such as monopoly selling and 
supply controls being listed at the other end (Balderstone, et al., 
1982). However, there appears to be very little research on why 
different degrees of regulation emerge in different industries, nor do 
changes ; n uncoordi nated or unregl..ll ated opt; ons appear to have been 
addressed in the traditional agricultural economics literature. 
Furthennore, the accepted path, and it rationale, from an 
unregul ated industry to statutory i nvol vernent via cc-operati ve 
organisation, should be treated with some scepticism. It is obvious 
that many industries do not conform to th'is evolutionary pattern, and 
therefore, the existence of such a progression should not be accepted 
in any mechanistic sense. In summary, the issue of why alternative 
marketi ng channel s, both statutory and non- statutory, ari se or 
co-exist, does not appear to have been adequately investigated in the 
conventional agricultural economics literature. 
However, the transaction costs framework which is now famil iar 
in the economics literature has been used to examine issues similar to 
that of why marketing channels might emerge or co-exist. In addition, 
it would be possible to focus on the mechanics of the short-term price 
formation processes which emerge between producers and their marketing 
agents when using this framework. Consequently, this theory may be 
able to offer appropriate insights into the evolution of agricultural 
marketing channels. 
1.3 An Evaluation of Marketing Channel Performance 
In addition to the positive question of why alternative 
channels arise or co-exist, the normative issue of whether these 
cnannel s meet sped fied performance cri teri a is al so of importance. In 
general, such performance criteria are based on broad efficiency 
concepts, such as whether existing resources are efficiently allocated, 
and whether alternative channels have the ability to capture market 
opportunities and to adapt to changes in them. 
The agricultural economics literature is replete with studies 
on the efficiency of various aspects of marketing, much of which has 
been reviewed by Bateman (1976) and Breimyer (1973). Such studies 
include the evaluation of various types of statutory institution and an 
assessment of the economic and technical efficiency with which they 
perform their various functions (Campbell, 1973; Warley, 1963; Rae, 
1980; Davies, 1960; Veeman. 1972; Guter and Low, 1971). Market 
channel analysis has encompassed the analysis of imperfectly 
competitive relationships (Brandow, 1969; Youde and Helmberger, 1966), 
the structure-conduct-performance paradi gm (Cl odius and Muell er, 1961), 
integration and contracting (Logan, 1969; Allen, 1972), and the 
behaviour of marketing margins (Wollen and Turner, 1970). 
However, 
insights which 
the concept of 
contract and 
contes tabil i ty. 
can assist in 
marketi ng. 
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this traditional analysis does not incorporate 
ari se from more recent economi c theori sing, i ncl udi ng 
non-zero adjustment and transaction costs, the related 
agency theory, and the new theory of market 
It would be useful to assess whether these theories 
the evaluation of efficiency issues in agricultural 
When assessing efficiency issues, attention would have to be 
paid to efficiency indicators such as channel contestability, either 
directly or at arms length, as suggested by barriers to entry or 
inhibitions to channel selection, or alternatively, whether destructive 
competition occurs as has been suggested by the so called Iweak 
sellingl arguments. 
Other such factors would include the adequacy of price 
signalling and channel monitoring, and the extent to which these are 
obscured by payment procedures or government policies. Such question 
impinge on channel adaptability, as do issues relating to innovation, 
the adequate provision of marketing services, and the appropriateness 
of economic incentives for product and market development. 
If any such evaluation of marketing channel performance 
indicated that efficiency criteria were not being met, then Government 
may have a rol e to p"1 ay in rectifyi ng thi s situati on. Any such rol e 
would depend on the source of the inefficiencies. For example, if it 
is difficult to assess the performance of alternative channels, then 
Government may be able to assist by providing relevant infonnation. 
Al ternatively, if regulatory barriers to channel entry exist, and 
i neffi ci enci es are seen to ari se from these, then it may be appropri ate 
for Government to remove such barr; ers. Consequently, the percei ved 
sources of channel inefficiency would be important when detennining any 
appropriate Government response. 
1.4 Research Objective 
In view of the above discussion, the objective of the research 
presented in this Report is to evaluate whether more recent economic 
theories on contractual arrangements assist in explaining why 
particular marketing channels might evolve, and whether existing 
channels meet accepted criteria for efficiency. 
The remainder of the Report will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 will examine the economics of contractual arrangements. It 
will include a discussion of concepts used 1n transaction costs 
analysis and issues which influence contractual arrangements. Chapter 
3 will review the research methods commonly associated with this type 
of study, while Chapter 4 will examine the applicability of aspects of 
the economics of contractual arrangements to some of the marketing 
channel issues which were previously discussed. A checklist of factors 
which should be considered when contemplating empirical research which 
utilises these newer economic concepts is presented as an Appendix. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS 
2.1 Transaction Costs Analysis Defined 
Economic theories relating to contractual arrangements have 
emerged from the ori gi nal 1; terature on transact; ons costs. The 
concept of tra~saction costs was initially investigated by Coase (1937) 
in his analysis of why finns emerge in a specialised economy. Coase 
hypothesised that there were costs associated with using the price 
mechanism to organise production, and that the most obvious cost was 
associated with discovering what the relevant prices were. A further 
component of such costs would De the costs of negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction. Coase 
pOinted out however, that price discovery costs could be reduced by the 
emergence of markets such as product exchanges. 
Despite these mechani sms, transact; on costs wi 11 sti 11 be 
positive although minimised, and this Coase theorised. would lead to 
the emergence of firms when the costs of organising transactions within 
a firm are less than the costs of doing so on the open market. Firms 
would continue to grow until the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying 
out the transaction in the open market, which assumes decreasing 
returns to the within-firm entrepreneurial function. 
Despite being written almost half a century ago, Coase's 
insights into the emergence of the firm did not achieve popular 
recognition until recently (Cheung, 1983), and in the meantime, 
advances in the theory of the firm developed along standard 
neo-classical lines. However, in recent years, this neo-classical 
model of firm behaviour has come under increasing attack aimed at some 
of its assumptions which are perceived to be unrealistic. Such 
assumptions include zero transaction costs, fully allocated and 
privately held property rights, profit maximisation, and by 
implication, cost minimisation. One branch of the literature 
investigated alternative maximising behaviour (for example, sales 
maximisation), whereas another avenue explored managerial theories of 
behaviour which sought to explain why costs might not be minimised. 
Reviews of these two alternative theories of firm behaviour may be 
found in De Al essi (1983). 
A third revision of neo-classical analysis focussed on the 
property rights and transaction costs assumptions, thereby resurrecting 
Coase's theory. De Alessi (1983) is of the opinion that these advances 
in transaction costs analysis are a signficant improvement over the 
alternative managerial extensions to neo-classical analysis, such as 
Leibenstein's X-efficiency concept. He bases this conclusion on the 
observation that the latter concept focuses on preference relations 
that are not observable, and therefore, fail to yield testable 
hypotheses. On the other hand, he notes that the property rights/ 
transaction costs generalisation does yield testable hypotheses on the 
clustering of resource rights and the evolution of alternative forms of 
business enterprise. 
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Hence, transaction costs analysis has gained increasing 
credence as a framework for analysi ng the emergence of al ternative fi rm 
types. However, recent advances in the theory have altered the problem 
emphasis by focusing on business choices as the unit of analysis. 
That is, tile emphasis has shifted from the firm level to the 
contractual level, and interest is concentrated on the relationship 
between a principal and an agent. This approach allows a wide range of 
problems to be investigated using the same analytical tool. 
With this resurgence of interest, the concept of transaction 
costs has been considerably refined. Rather than simply referring to 
the costs of price discovery, more detailed cost components have been 
identified. One such component on which much literature has been 
centred is agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; 
Cameron and Duignan, 1984). 
Agency costs are those portion of transaction costs which arise 
when the principal in a relationship delegates authority to an agent. 
and must then incur costs to ensure that tih~ dJent behaves in the 
principal's interest, since given utility maximisation by both parties, 
there is no guarantee that this will occur. In the literature, this 
problem of divergent objectives between the principal and agent is 
referred to as the problem of moral hazard or the agency problem. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that a principal incurs agency costs 
when establishing appropriate incentives for the agent. and when 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit aberrant activities of the 
agent. In turn, an agent may incur expenditures known as bonding 
costs, which guarantees that the agent will not take certain actions 
which will harm the principal. Despite these monitoring and bonding 
activities, it is unlikely that the interests of the prinCipal and 
agent will completely coincide, and hence, a reduction in welfare is 
experienced by the principal which ;s also attributable to the agency 
relationship. This component of agency costs is referred to as 
residual loss. The total Qj·~[lCj (~osts incurred in any contractual 
relationship are the sum of the above components. 
An example of how the agency costs extension to transaction 
costs analysis i/lay be useful is in seeking an explanation of why one 
type of contract may supersede anotill~r·. III this case, the substitution 
of cU!ltractual arrangements will cease when the savings in transaction 
costs of price discovery equal the rise in agency costs at the margin 
(Cheung, 1983; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
In suribnary, transact; on costs analyst s. broadly defi ned, 
focuses on the nature and magnitude of positive transaction costs. and 
its implications for the outcomes of contracts and economic structures. 
The focus of recent applications of the analysis is at the contractual 
level. and concentrates on the principal-agent relationship with 
varying degrees of sophisticat'ion. The theory has been applied to a 
wide range of problems. Examples include land tenure arrangements 
(Cheung. 1969; Lucas, 1979), employment contracts (Stiglitz, 1975; 
Cheung, 1983) and firm types (Alchian and Demsetz. 1972). The 
literature also contains a host of other ex~nples. 
The discussion will "U~ turn to the issues which are addressed 
through the application of transaction costs analysis to contractual 
arrangements. 
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2.2 Issues Which Influence Contractual Arrangements 
From the literature, it would appear that a number of 
inter-related factors determine the nature of contractual arrangements 
which arise in a particular situation. These include the nature and 
distribution of information imperfections which determine risk 
perceptions, and the magnitude of transaction costs. Other significant 
factors include risk preferences and the existing allocation of 
property ri ghts. 
The contractual arrangements which arise in any situation seek 
to perform a number of functions. These include signalling product or 
input characteristics to appropriate parties, distributing risk between 
parties, and providing appropriate incentives for parties to perform. 
The way in which contracts are structured, and therefore, the 
extent to which they perform these functions, has implications for the 
performance of the market; n9 system as a whol e. For exampl e, the types 
of contract which exist have implications for the level and variability 
of prices at various points in the marketing channel, and for the 
degree of marketing effort (such as product and market development) 
expended at various stages in the marketing system. Some of the 
factors listed above and the functions of contracts will now be 
discussed. 
Sources of contractual risk have received some attention in the 
transaction costs literature (Leonard and Zeckhauser, 1985; Cheung, 
1969). Such risk tends to be of two types. Firstly, there is 
uncertainty associated with the future value of random variables. 
Secondly there is uncertainty associated with whether agents will 
perform in the manner preferred by the principal. 
The former type of risk is referred to as natural risk. It may 
be composed of exogeneous supply-side elements, as occurs in many 
agricultural industries, or it may be associated with demand, or with 
both aspects. Where such ri sk is demand rel ated, the di stributi on of 
information may be such that asymmetries exist. That is, demand 
conditions may be more obvious to some parties than to others, and this 
may influence the nature of any contractual arrangement. 
The second risk aspect referred to above is the moral hazard 
element of risk, or the agency problem referred to previously. This 
has been dealt with in some depth in the literature, particularly in 
the context of managers of public companies who are principals in the 
relationship acting as agents on behalf of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Much of this agency literature centres 
on the magnitude of agency costs under different firm structures, and 
whether such costs are likely to be minimised in these circumstances 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Klein, 1980). With respect to this latter 
issue, greater confidence that the agency costs in a contractual 
arrangement are m; n1m; sed is warranted when appropri ate mechani sms 
exist to discipline the agency relationship. For example, in the case 
of public companies, the extent to which a manager's behaviour diverges 
from the interest of shareholders will be limited by the stock market 
assessment of the value of a share in the corporation. Falling stock 
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prices influence the ability of management to raise further' capital, 
and expose the corporation to the threat of takeover bids. This leads 
to a situation where competing Inanagers Cdn displace current managers 
who are not performing in the shareholders interests. However, other 
firm structures do not have these specific disciplining mechanisms 
(Cameron and Duignan, 1984; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Zwart, 1984) 
and in these cases, agency costs are higher, or alternative 
disciplining procedures arise. 
In general. therefore, the above discussion illustrates how the 
types and degt'ee of ri sk may i I1f1 uence the type of contract chosen ina 
particular situation. However, risk preferences also have implications 
for contractual arrangements. For example both parties may be 
ri sk-averse. or one :j}dY be ri sk-neutral. In the fi rst case, contracts 
which share risk could be expected to emerge, whereas in the second 
case, the risk-neutral party is likely to bear t'isk. Although a third 
case could conceivably exist where both parties are risk-neutral, this 
possibility is of litth~ r,:!levance, since risk would be of no 
significance in any contractual arrangement. Despite the fact that 
some theoretical studies distinguish between risk-neutral and 
risk-averse preferences by principals and agents (Shavel1, 1979), in 
general both parties are likely to be risk-averse. 
The nature of property rights will also influence the nature 
and performance of contracts. For example, a di sti nct; on between 
private and publicly owned firms is that ownership in the latter case 
1-; r}')'l-transferable. This rules out specialisation in ownership, 
inhibiting the capitalisation of future value consequences into current 
transfer prices dnd reducing the incentive of those who bear such 
consequences to monitor managerial behaviour. As a result, private 
fi rms are 1 ike 1y to behave more effi ci ently tllJl1 C~Jr'lparab 1 e 
government-owned firms (de Alessi, 1933; Cameron and Duignan, 1984). 
A furth~r example of the relationship betvleen the Ildture of property 
rights and the structure of incentives are the problems associated with 
team producti on. In thi s case, there are several types of resources, 
not all of which belong to the same person, and output is not the Srjln 
of separable outputs. Tilerefore, an incentive problem exists as to how 
to reward team members ina manner whi ch induces them to work 
efficiently (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Conversely, where total 
output is the sum of separable outputs, then team-incentive problems 
are removed, and appropriate incentives are provided through reward 
systems based on output, such as piece rates (Cheung, 1983). It is 
possible to envisage other property rights issues in agricultural 
marketing channels which influence the nature of emerging contracts. 
In the above discussion, a positive orientation has been tdk'~:) 
to identify factors which influence the types of contract whi::!ll1!Uh;: 
emerge. However, it is also instructive to consider nor;ilatil/\~issues, 
and to focus on the types of functi ons whi ch contracts perform. 
Different contractual arrangements can then be evaluated according to 
whether they perform these functions adequately whell jurlged against 
particular perfonnance uGjectiv2s. As noted earlier, contracts seek tu 
Signal charact;~rjstics. to provide performance incentives, and tu 
allocate risk (Leonard and Zeckhauser, 1985; Stiglitz, 1975). 
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Some authors focus on one of the above functions in their 
analysis. For example, Cheung (1969) concentrates on the risk aspects 
of contracts. He advances the hypothesis that contractual arrangements 
are chosen so as to maximise the gain from risk dispersion subject to 
the constraint of transaction costs. He uses this hypothesis to 
explain why different types of contractual arrangement may coexist. 
Other authors, however, concentrate on the incentive problem, seeking 
to explain why different types of agency relationship may arise (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Lucas, 1979; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
However, another strand of the literature concentrates on the 
dual functions of providing performance incentives and of allocating 
risk, and on the trade-offs which may occur between the two (Fama, 
1980; Shavel1, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Stiglitz, 1975). For example. 
risk sharing may lead to a reduction in incentives (moral hazard). 
Stiglitz (1975) observed this when he noted that, under an employment 
contract, piece rates induce employees to perform but requires them to 
bear a high degree of risk. Time rates remove some of this risk, but 
also removes performance incentives at the same time. Stiglitz (1975) 
concludes that, in this case, the appropriate choice of payment will 
depend on the attitudes toward risk of workers and employers, effort 
supply elasticities, the sources and magnitude of uncertainties, and 
the nature of the supervision used in the employment situation. 
Not surprisingly, there appears to be very little literature 
which considers the problems associated with simultaneously performing 
the three contractual functions of signalling characteristics, 
providing performance incentives and allocating risk, although the 
study of Leonard and Zeckhauser (1985) is an exception to this. They 
commented that attempting such a task places a heavy burden on 
contracts, which cannot be expected to provide full optimality in the 
performance of all three functions. They noted, therefore, that 
inefficiencies with respect to each of these functions may result. How 
functional trade-offs are made in any particular contractual situation 
will have implications fur efficiency and performance. 
The above Chapter has considered some of the factors which 
influence contractual arrangements, and also the functions which 
contracts seek to perform. It was determined that contractual concepts 
had been utilised in both a positive and a normative sense to analyse 
business choices. As such, it focusses on the short-term price 
formation processes which were identified in the previous Chapter as 
being important when examining agriucltural marketing issues. 

CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
The techniques which have been used to analyse contractual 
arrangements will now be discussed. This will be accomplished through 
a detailed examination of representative types of study, followed by a 
critique of the methods used in such analyses. In this way, the types 
of technique used can be demonstrated, and the conclusions which emerge 
from such models can be evaluated. This approach highlights the 
strengths and inadequacies of contractual choice concepts when 
evaluating agricultural marketing issues. As noted in the previous 
Chapter, studies tend to have either a positive or a normative 
orientation, although in a few cases, both aspects are considered. 
Examples of studies with a positive emphasis include Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), Cheung (1969), Cheung (1983), Zwart (1984) and 
Leonard and Zeckhauser (1985). Cheung (1969) and Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) will be reviewed in this Chapter, since the techniques used in 
these studies appear to be representative, and they clearly illustrate 
how theories of contractual choice might be useful when analysing how 
alternative agricultural marketing channels might emerge. 
There appear to be a large number of studies with a normative 
emphasis which utilise these concepts, including Zusman and Etgar 
(1981), Lucas (1979), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Stiglitz 
(1975). Since the methodology and emphasis in these different studies 
is essentially similar, the Shavel1 (1979) study will be reviewed for 
illustrative purposes. 
3.2 The Positive Approach 
3.2.1. Cheung'S Study on Land Tenure 
Tne first study to be examined will be that of Cheung (1969). 
He attempted to explain the observed co-existence of several forms of 
land tenure contract in Chinese agriculture, namely fixed rent, share 
and wage contracts. He considered alternative explanatory hypotheses, 
which he then rejected or accepted on the basis of empirical 
observation. The first such hypothesis was that contracts were chosen 
to minimise transaction costs. However, he rejected this since, he 
reasoned, it implied that share contracts would never be chosen, which 
was obviously not the case. The second hypothesis which he examined 
was that transaction costs were the same for each type of contract, and 
that contracts were chosen so as to share risk between parties. 
However, in these circumstances, it would be difficult to justify the 
existence of fixed rent or wage contracts. 
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As a consequence of these observations, Cheung hypothesised 
that a choice of contractual arrangement was made so as to maximise the 
gain from risk dispersion sUbject to the constraint of transaction 
costs. The magnitude of transaction costs and the distribution of risk 
were then evaluated for alternative contracts. 
By defining transaction costs to be those costs associated with 
contract negotiation and enforcement he concluded that share contracts 
had higher transaction costs than fixed rent or wage contracts, since 
there is need to reach mutual agreement on a rental percentage, the 
ratio of non-land input to land and the types of crop to be grown. For 
the other types of contract, however, only one party is sufficient to 
decide how much of the other party· s resources to employ and what crops 
to grow, given the market prices. Hence, transaction costs are assumed 
to be lower in these cases. Cheung found it difficult to distinguish 
between fixed rent or wage contracts with respect to transaction costs, 
since shirking was a problem associated with enforcing wage contracts, 
whereas asset (such as soil) maintenance was an enforcement problem 
with fixed rent contracts. 
Cheung then considered the distribution of risk 
alternative contract types. He noted that under fixed 
arrangements, the tenant bears most of the risk, whereas under 
contracts, the landowner does likewise. However, under 
agreements risk is dispersed through the risk-sharing procedures. 
Consequently, since some dispersion of risk is preferred 
dispersion at all, a share contract will be chosen rather than 
rent or wage contracts if the higher transaction costs are at 
compensated for by the gain in risk dispersion. 
under 
rent 
wage 
share 
to no 
fixed 
1 east 
Cheung made a number of observations which he felt supported 
his hypothesis. 
1. In the first instance, it is reasonable to speculate that share 
contracts would not arise in cases where third parties insure 
the amount of crop yield. In Japan, wnere compulsory crop 
insurance has been enforced by Government, share tenancy is 
rare. In Chi na, however, such insurance is uncommon and share 
tenancy is relatively more widespread. 
2. Supply-side risk is greater for wheat relative to rice, since 
higher proportional yield variances occur in the former. If 
the transaction costs of the same contractual arrangement are 
similar for both crops, then share arrangements are likely to 
be more common with wheat crops. This appears to occur in 
China, where share tenancy is more frequent in the wheat region 
than in the rice region. 
3. Under share arrangements, the landowner bears a greater degree 
of risk than under fixed crop rent agreements. Therefore, 
where the two types of contract coexist, it is to be expected 
that share rent would be slightly higher than fixed crop rent, 
thereby providing a return for risk-bearing to the landowner. 
Such a situation is observable in China. 
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4. By a detailed examination of contract stipulations, Cheung was 
able to make further observations with respect to market 
arrangements and contractual choice which he felt supported his 
hypothesi s. 
(a) He noted that during periods of inflation when 
transaction costs associated with fixed cash rent 
contracts are relatively high, cash rents tend to be 
converted into crop rents or share contracts. 
(b) Fixed rent agreements often include an escape clause 
for the tenant during famine years, during which a 
rental reduction applies, thereby imposing a risk 
burden on the landowner. Conceptually, a whole· range 
of escape clauses could be envisaged with a higher 
fixed rent associated with an increased number of 
escape clauses. However, increasing transaction costs 
would be associated with further escape provisions, 
which would eventually lead to the supersession of this 
type of contract by a share 'contract, where multiple 
lescape l provisions for the tenant are implicit. The 
existence of an escape clause would increase the 
popularity of fixed rent contracts relative to share 
contracts. Hence, it would be expected that share 
contracts would be relatively scarce where fixed-rent 
contracts with escape clauses exist, and the converse 
to apply in cases where fixed rent contracts do not 
have escape provlsl0ns. Cheung noted that China had 
escape provisions in fixed rent agreements, and that a 
relatively high proportion of these agreements existed 
there. However, other parts of South East Asia did not 
have such provisions in these agreements, and in these 
regions, share contracts were relatively more popular. 
Cheung concluded his study by noting that the introduction of 
transaction costs and risks within a choice theoretic context provided 
a fruitful approach to an examination of the question of why different 
contractual arrangements are chosen under the same system of private 
property rights. However, he acknowledged that his analysis avoided 
certain issues, either explicitly or implicitly. As he noted, he did 
not consider risky choices other than those which were contractual. In 
addition, he abstracted from the choice and development of legal 
institutions, and from contractual behaviour associated with different 
property rights constraints. 
3.2.2. Alchian and Demsetz's Study on Firm Types 
Another study with a strong positive element which utilizes 
contractual choice concepts is that by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
They were concerned with the situation where team effort leads to 
greater output than separable production, and their focus was on 
metering input productivity and rewards under different organisational 
types, or the problem of shirking under team production. Transaction 
costs are implicit in this problem, since there are positive costs and 
trade-offs associated with organising and disciplining team members. 
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One method of reducing shirking which the authors specifically 
investigate is for someone to specialize as a monitor to check the 
input performance of team members. The question then arises as to who 
will monitor the monitor. They identify two potential constraints on 
the tendency of monitors to shirk. 
The first of these is market competition offered by other 
monitors, although they feel that this constraint is not perfectly 
effective. An alternative constraint can be imposed by giving the 
monitor title to the net earnings of the team, net of payments to other 
inputs. That is, the monitor becomes the residual claimant. The 
authors then examine the characteristics of a range of firm types and 
comment on the shirking problem with respect to these alternative firm 
types. They begin with the assumption that the cost of managing a 
team's input by a central monitor, who disciplines himself or herself 
because he or she is a residual claimant, is low relative to the cost 
of metering the marginal outputs of team members. Conversely, the cost 
of team production is increased if the residual claim is not held 
entirely by the central monitor. Four firm types considered by the 
authors will now by reviewed. 
Profit-sharing firms are the first such type to be examined 
according to this criterion. In this case, if all team members 
profit-share, then it is to be expected that losses from shirking will 
be greater when the team size is large. That is, if the optimal team 
size were only two input owners, then each has a stronger incentive to 
reduce shirking than if optimal team size were large, since in the 
latter case, only a small percentage of losses occasioned by the 
shi rker wi 11 be borne by him or her. 
The authors concluded therefore, that profit-sharing to 
encourage self-policing is more appropriate for small teams. In 
addition, they deduced that profit sharing is more viable if small team 
size is associated with situations where the cost of specialized 
management of inputs is large relative to the increased productivity 
potential in team effort. In support of these observations, Alchian 
and Demetz noted that profit sharing tends to be limited to 
partnerships with a relatively small number of active partners, and 
that these partnerships tend to be of an artistic or professional 
nature. 
The authors then examined socialist firms which are employee 
owned, using as a model firms of this type in Jugoslavia. This is 
essentially a variant of profit-sharing firms, since all employees 
share in the residual. However, such firms also employ a central 
monitor. In these circumstances, it would be expected that losses from 
enhanced shi rki ng by the mon; tor wou·' d exceed gai ns from reduced 
shirking by residual-sharing employees. Therefore, such a structure is 
~nlikely to emerge naturally, and where it is politically imposed, it 
is to be expected that some management tecnnique will arise to reduce 
shirking by the central monitor. In support of this hypothesis, the 
authors note that in Jugoslavia, employee committees can recommend the 
termination of a manager's contract with an enterprise. 
The third firm type examined was the corporation, where equity 
capital is raised by many investors contributing small portions of a 
large investment. The problem then arises of how to cope with 
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managerial shirking when profit-sharing occurs among a large number of 
corporate shareholders. In such cases, decision authority is 
transferred to a smaller group who manages other team inputs. Two 
important mechanisms for monitoring this management team were 
identified by Alchian and Demsetz. The first was that stockholders can 
revise the management composition through bloc voting procedures at 
meetings. An alternative procedure is to sell shares when managerial 
policies are disapproved of. In this case, share values become an 
indication of managerial performance. 
The presence of share markets where efficiency is ensured by 
the activities of investment analysts, and the widespread existence of 
corporate charters which facilitate takeovers provides some empirical 
evidence that managerial shirking is monitored under this type of 
organisational structure. 
A fourth type of organisational structure which the authors 
considered was the non-profit firm, such as a mutual firm or a 
co-operative. Under this structure, the future consequences of 
improved management cannot be capitalized into the present wealth of 
stockholders, nor can multiple ownership shares be bought by one 
person. -Hence, the procedures for disciplining the management of a 
corporation are absent under this corporate structure, and therefore, 
it would be expected that managerial shirking is greater in non-profit 
making, mutually owned enterprises. Alchian and Demsetz do not support 
this hypothesizing by empirical observation, but merely note that this 
type of enterprise would appear to be more appropriate where more 
shirking is desired, or where redirected uses of the enterprise in 
response to market revealed values is less desired. 
Although Alchian and Demsetz concentrate more on the hypothesis 
formulation stage of theory selection rather than on actual hypothesis 
testing, nevertheless they do derive testable implications through 
their analysis of different types of organisation, and make some casual 
empirical observations which support their hypothesizing on managerial 
shirking. 
3.2.3. An Evaluation of Positive Techniques Which Use Contractual 
Cholce Analysis 
The concept of positive transaction costs appears to be 
well-entrenched in the literature and would appear to have considerable 
potential for explaining why alternative contractual arrangements might 
emerge or co-exist under similar property rights constraints. This is 
particularly so when considered in conjunction with concepts such as 
risk aversion. 
As de Alessi(1983) notes, a major advantage of the theory lies 
in the fact that observable predictions can be relatively easily 
deduced from hypotheses, and therefore, on methodological grounds, the 
theory is superior to any alternative explanations for the co-existence 
of contractual arrangements, where testable predictions cannot be 
easily deduced. 
To elaborate, the model of economic explanation used in the 
positive approach, outlined in the previous Section, ;s essentially the 
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'hypothetico-deductive ' model. That is, an iterative process of theory 
selection occurs through hypothesis formulation, followed by the 
deduction of observable predictions from the hypothesis, then empirical 
testing of these predictions. If necessary, the hypothesis is revised, 
and the process of deducing and testing subsequent predictions 
repeated. Ward (1983) elaborates on these steps. 
This process ;s well illustrated in the Cheung analysis, but 
less so in the Alchian and Demsetz study. In the latter case, the 
authors concentrated more on formulating their hypotheses and deducing 
observable predictions from these hypothesis, rather than on 
empirically testing them. 
While an acknowledged advantage of this approach lies in its 
ability to formulate testable predictions, potential problems could 
arise in the empirical testing phase of the procedure. In the first 
instance, empirical observations tend to be of a qualitative rather 
than a quantitative nature. However, in some cases, it may not be 
intuitively obvious how transaction costs are defined, or what the 
relative magnitude of transaction costs are under different contractual 
arrangements. For example, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) dispute Cheung's 
contention that share cropping involves greater transaction costs than 
a wage contract. Since aspects of transaction costs are not 
quantifiable, the explanatory power of the model is restricted in such 
ci rcumstances. 
Secondly, the casual nature of some of the empirical analysis 
in this type of study gives cause for concern. To quote an example, 
Cheung deduced that when escape clauses occurred in fixed rent 
contracts, then share contracts would be rare. He duly noted that in 
China, where such escape provisions were common in fixed contracts, a 
relatively high proportion of such contracts existed. However, in 
other parts of South-East Asia where such provisions are not common in 
fixed-rent agreements, share contracts are more in evidence. 
Therefore, on the basis of this and other qualitative observations, he 
accepts the hypothesis that contracts are chosen to maximise the gain 
from risk dispersion subject to the constraint of transaction costs. 
However, the very general nature of this empirical observation on the 
relative frequency of share contracts makes the implicit assumption 
that all else is held constant somewhat suspect, and therefore, must 
increase the probability of accepting a null hypothesis which is false, 
or of rejecting one which is true. 
Transaction costs analysis appears to have considerable 
potential for explaining important aspects of contractual choice. 
However, the above caveat on its use in a positive analytical sense 
must be kept in mind, and the concept of transaction costs utilised in 
any study would need to be carefully defined, with due attention being 
paid to measurement aspects. 
3.3 The Normative Approach 
3.3.1. Shavel1 l s Study on Risk Sharing and Incentives 
Shavell (1979) concerned himself with optimal arrangements for 
risk-sharing and incentives in the prinCipal/agent relationship. 
Transaction cost concepts enter into his analysis to the extent that a 
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random element is associated with the outcome of an agent's effort on 
the principal's Dehalf. In addition, the principal may have imperfect 
(or no) information on the agent's effort, and the problem of moral 
hazard may arise from inappropriate incentive structures. 
More specifically. Shavel1 considered the situation where the 
principal benefits from the outcome of the agent's activity. This 
outcome is determined by the agent's effort and a random element. The 
prinCipal then pays the agent a fee. The question which arises is how 
this fee should be related to outcome or the agent's effort when 
alternative assumptions are made on attitudes to risk-bearing and on 
the extent and quality of the principal's information on the agent's 
effort. 
A set of assumptions limiting the scope of the analysis were 
then made. Specifically. it was assumed that: 
a) The principal and agent act to maximise expected 
utility, where the principal's utility depends on 
wealth, while the agent's utility depends on wealth and 
effort. 
b) The outcome depends on effort and a random state of 
nature, but increased effort results in a higher 
outcome regardless of the state of nature. In 
addition, the agent makes a decision on effort before 
the state of nature is known. 
c) The fee depends only on variables known to both 
parties. 
d) Mathematical functions are assumed to have the usual 
properties and solutions are assumed to be unique. 
Having made such assumptions, the problem of how to set a fee 
schedule which provides adequate performance incentives while 
appropri ately all ocati ng ri sk was then represented symbol ically. 
First, take the situation where the prinCipal knows only the outcome, 
x. Now, given a fee schedule, the agent selects effort, e, which 
maximizes his or her expected utility. 
Therefore, in this case, the principal will pay a fee,¢ , such 
that ¢ = ¢(x). The agent maximizes expected utility over effort, e. 
r (1) EV(¢,e) = JV(¢(x), e) r(x;e}dx 
where V is the agent's utility and r(x;e) is the probability density of 
the outcome, x, given effort, e. 
However, where the principal knows the outcome, x, but also has 
an observation, z, on the agent1s effort, then he or she will pay a 
fee, ¢, such that ¢ = ¢(x,z). In this case, where the agent maximizes 
expected utility over effort e, then 
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(2) EV(<fJ,e) = If V(<fJ(x,z) ,e) q(z/x;e)dz r(x;e)dx 
where q(z/x;e) is the probability density of the observation on effort, 
z, given the outcome, x, and effort, e. 
Turning to the principal's expected utility, when a fee 
schedule and agent's effort are given, this is represented by 
( 3 ) E U (¢ ,e) = f U (x - ¢ ( x)) r( x; e) dx 
where U -is the principal's utility. 
Therefore, the problem of the principal and agent is to find a 
Pareto optimal fee schedule. Now a fee schedule, ¢, is Pareto optimal 
if it solves the problem 
(4) max EU(¢,e) over ¢ 
subject to 
(5) EV(¢,e) ? Vo 
where Vo is determined by bargaining power or market forces (that is, 
the utility level which the agent could achieve by going elsewhere), 
and 
(6) EV(¢,e) is maximised over e 
It is assumed that the first-order condition 
(7) EVe (¢ ,e) = 0 
identifies the solution to (6). The problem of maximizing EU(<fJ,e) over 
¢ and e subject to (5) only describes a Pareto optimum solution where e 
as well as <fJ can be directly chosen. 
Shavell then solved the above constrained maximization problem, 
and derived propositions appropriate for different attitudes to risk 
and for different assumptions on information on the agent's effort 
available to the principal. 
For the case where the prinCipal has no information on effort, 
the fee depends on outcome alone. If the agent is risk neutral, there 
exists a Pareto optimal fee schedule under which the agent is paid the 
outcome minus a constant which is the risk-averse principal's share. 
Such a schedule allocates risk in a desirable way and provides the 
right incentive to the agent. 
However, when such an agent is risk-averse, the above solution 
subjects the agent alone to the risk associated with the outcome. On 
the other hand. insuring the agent against risk by setting a fee equal 
to a constant 1 eaves no incentive for effort. In thi s case, a Pareto 
optimal fee schedule vJDuld be one where the agent is paid an amount 
which must depend to some extent on the outcome, but the agent never 
bears all the risk. 
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Shavell then turned to the situation where the principal has 
i nfonnati on about the agent I s effort, in whi ctl case the fee may depend 
on both the outcome and the indicator of effort. Where the agent is 
risk-neutral, the Pareto optimal fee schedule is one under which the 
agent is paid an amount which depends only on the outcome. That is, 
the information on the agent's effort is of no value, since as in the 
previous risk neutral case considered, the optimal fee schedule is one 
where the agent is paid the outcome minus a constant. 
However, where the agent is risk-averse but the principal has 
information on the agent's effort, then a Pareto optimal fee schedule 
is one where the fee depends partly on this effort, thereby removing 
from the agent some of the risk associated with a risky outcome. 
Shavell noted that the actual extent to which the fee depends on effort 
depends on the degree of accuracy with which effort can be observed. A 
complication to the analysis is introduced by the fact that the 
principal introduces a new source of risk by relying on imperfect 
information about effort. However, despite this new risk, a 
Pareto-optimal fee schedule \'Iould still depend on this information. 
Hence, information about effort always has some value where the agent 
is risk averse. 
To conclude, Shave'l considered examples of the principal-agent 
relationship. These included strict liability versus negligence 
standards in the control of stochastic externalities such as 
environmental damage~ moral hazard and insurance, lawyer and client 
relationships, and contracts between shareholders and the manager of a 
firm. By using the results of his analysis, he was able to make 
normative judgments on the appropriateness of alternative contractual 
arrangements in each of these cases. 
3.3.2. An Evaluation of Normative Techniques Using Transaction 
Cost Analysis 
The methodological technique employed by researchers such as 
Shavell (1979) to tackle nonnative issues arising from the 
principal-agent relationship belongs to the so-called 'radical 
apriorist' school of economic reasoning. Practitioners of this 
approach perceive economic theories to be systems of logical deductions 
from a series of postulates derived from introspection, and as such, 
these theories are not subject to empirical validation (Ward, 1983). 
Therefore, the only relevant test of any particular proposition derived 
by using this technique is the validity of the logic used to derive the 
propositions from the general assumptions. 
This process can be demonstrated by reference to the above 
study, where propositions on optimal arrangements with respect to 
risk-sharing and incentives in the principal-agent relationship were 
derived. In order to do this, Shavell made a number of general 
assumptions, including which variables determine utilities, outcomes 
and the fee schedule. Using these assumed relationships, the problem 
of how to set an optimal fee schedule was then formulated 
mathematically as a constrained maximization prOblem. The first-order 
conditions associated with this function were then derived using 
appropriate mathematical techniques, and propositions were derived from 
the solution procedure. Once such propositions have been established, 
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they can be used as a Pareto-optimal benchmark against which to 
evaluate existing contractual arrangements with respect to risk-sharing 
and incentive structures. 
The advantage of this type of analysis is that normative 
guidelines can emerge, against which the actual performance of 
marketing channels can be evaluated. However, caution is warranted 
with such an approach, since the problems which tend to be investigated 
are quite specific, and dependent on assumptions about the operation of 
an economic system which may be somewhat restrictive. In particular, 
variables which influence relationships may be quite limited. 
A second limitation arises when propositions which are derived 
from different studies are used as a checklist against which to 
evaluate the performance of actual systems. However, the propositions 
from one study may have been derived under a different set of 
assumptions to those which emerge from another study, and there may be 
little indication as to how robust such propositions are with respect 
to changes in these assumptions. 
It must be stressed that the above criticisms are in no way 
confined to analyses using transaction costs concepts, but are general 
to all studies of this type, regardless of the economic notions which 
are employed. The concerns expressed above in no way invalidate 
economic theories which arise from this analytical technique, but 
merely indicate caution in their application. 
CHAPTER 4 
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE CONCEPTS AND MARKETING CHANNEL ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
The use of contractual choice concepts such as transaction 
costs has become increasingly popular when assessing the emergence and 
performance of alternative contractual arrangements. Despite this 
burgeoning literature with its wide range of applications, the use of 
these concepts in analYSing choices and incentives in agricultural 
marketing channels is relatively unknown. One exception to this is a 
study by Zusman and Etgar (1982) who derived an equilibrium set of 
contracts for a marketi ng channel, wni ch they then eval uated in terms 
of risk-sharing, allocative efficiency and the distribution of gains. 
A more specific analysis was undertaken by Zwart (1984) who attempted 
to explain aspects of exporter behaviour and marketing effort in the 
New Zealand meat industry prior to centralised Meat Board control by 
using transaction costs concepts. 
The extent to which such concepts assist in evaluating the 
marketing channel issues identified previously will now be examined. 
As a first step in this procedure, some of the factors which influence 
the nature of contractual arrangements between a producer (the 
principal) and his or her agent will be examined. In doing so, it will 
be assumed that both the principal and agent in any contractual 
arrangement are risk averse. The discussion, therefore, will centre on 
the magnitude of transaction costs, and factors which influence these. 
Recall that transaction costs were broadly defined to be the 
costs associated with discovering prices. Its more sophisticated 
vari ants i ncl ude more deta i1 ed components of thi s pri ce di scovery 
process, such as the actual costs of contract negotiation, uncertainty 
and information asymmetries associated with both demand and supply, and 
the various facets of agency costs associated with the relationship. 
4.2 The Distribution of Natural Risk and Information 
Some examples which illustrate these natural risk elements 
associated with infonnation imperfections are now outlined, and some 
casual hypothesiZing is undertaken with respect to transaction costs 
and contractual arrangements. 
Consider an industry which started as a result of an exporter1s 
effort in securing a market. This exporter would then seek product 
with which to supply the market. However, if the product was unknown 
to producers, then the exporter may have to offer forward contracts to 
induce the supplier to produce the crop. In this way, the exporter 
bears the price risk, while the supplier bears the risk associated with 
an unfalfliliar product. 
Contrast this situation with that where supply is production 
driven rather than market driven. In this case, the supplier has 
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product available, and requires an agent to find a market for this 
output. However, the agent may be unwilling to bear the price risk 
associated with a product whose market potential is unknown. 
Therefore, the producer may have to relieve the agent of this potential 
price risk by contracting a commission selling arrangement. 
These two examples illustrate how different contractual 
arrangements may arise in seemingly similar circumstances. In the 
first case, natural risk was greater on the supply side, thereby 
leading to a contractual arrangement where the exporter bears the price 
risk. In the second situation, such risk is concentrated on the demand 
si de, i n v~hi ch case the producer may accept the pri ce ri sk. 
Further consideration of the balance of this risk over time may 
also lead to insights into why contractual arrangements in an industry 
change. Consider the linseed example. In this case, the stimulus came 
from exporters who perceived export opportunities for the product. 
They offered producers forward contracts as an inducement to grow an 
unfamiliar crop. However, the exporters were unable to realise these 
forward prices which they had offered. As a consequence, they declined 
to offer such contracts in the following season. However, growers by 
that time were more familiar with the cropls cultural requirements and 
asked exporters to operate on their behalf as commission agents in 
export markets. 
Initially, risk by both parties was perceived to be greater at 
the supply end, which may have led to forward contracts being offered. 
However, as growers became more established, but markets appeared more 
uncertain, this balance of risk changed, which may have caused a change 
in the contractual selling arrangement. Hence, contractual options may 
have Iflip-flopped l as a result of changing risk perceptions in growing 
and marketing the product. 
The nature of this type of risk might also explain why similar 
channel options appear to occur in some industries. For example, where 
demand risk is seen to be greater, all agents may wish to offer a 
commission selling arrangement, and compete with each other at the 
margin. In this case, forward or fixed pricing agreements might not 
emerge. 
4.3 The Nature of the Product and Contractual Options 
It is possible to envisage situations in which the nature of 
the product influences the contractual arrangement. In some cases, the 
producer is responsible for determining the final form of the product, 
whereas in other cases he or she may be supplying a relatively 
homogenous input for a highly processed product. 
Where the supplier essentially determines the final form of the 
product, then processors or agents may set up forward contracts with 
growers, with fixed prices and product specifications. In the second 
situation, however, pressure may lead to some type of auction or 
exchange emerging fairly early in the marketing process, where property 
rights to the output are transferred from the grower to a commodity 
dealer or processor, who then directs the input into the next stage of 
the process. Alternatively. an institution operating collectively on 
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behalf of individual producers may emerge to direct homogeneous product 
to alternative end uses on behalf of producers. Such institutions 
essentially operate as commission agents and suppliers receive a pool 
price from product disbursement. 
4.4 Agency Considerations 
Consider the evolution of marketing channels in the context of 
agency relationships. In the barley industry, companies initially 
offered growers a fixed price for their product. However, these prices 
appeared to get out of line with the world product price, thereby 
creating an agency problem for producers. A group of growers responded 
by setting up their own co-operative which sold on commission and 
returned growers a pool price. 
It is of interest to note that the companies apparently raised 
their price to suppliers in response to the threat of producer 
co-ordination, and eventually switched to operating pooling 
arrangements as well. In this case, it proved relatively easy for 
producers to moni tor company performance, and to force down agency 
costs associated with the relationship by opening up an alternative 
marketing option. 
However, in his study of exporter behaviour in the New Zealand 
meat industry prior to 1982, Zwart (1984) noted instances where growers 
may find it difficult to monitor alternative marketing options, and 
hence, agency costs might not be minimized. For example, when schedule 
prices were set, they tended to reflect current market conditions. 
However, Zwart suggests that the commission agents may have been 
indulging in so-called weak pricing, which would suggest unfavourable 
market conditions, which would then be reflected in the schedule price. 
Hence, this schedule price would not provide a competitive check 
against comnission selling, since it was dependent, to an extent, on 
the price of product sold on commission. 
Tne co-operative ownership structure of many meat exporting 
fi rms is a further i ndi cati on of why agency costs to these 
relationships might not have been minimized. As Zwart notes, such 
institutions have the ability to take over other companies, but are 
themselves protected from being taken over. 
Therefore, unlike the barley example noted above, in this case 
it might not be possible to efficiently monitor channel performance 
relative to alternative marketing channels, and hence the extent of any 
agency problems might not be perceived, which would be an inhibition to 
channel switching or opening up a new channel. 
Agency problems might also arise when channels are not 
contestable because of regulatory barriers to entry. Zwart notes an 
instance of this in the meat industry prior to delicensing. Several of 
the larger companies controlled the majority of the processing 
facilities in the country, and under licenSing restrictions, they had 
the abil i ty to pl ace at 1 east some noti onal restri cti ons 011 product 
flows of other exporting companies. The open door policy may also have 
limited the contestability of this market, since under this policy the 
producer was required to nominate an exporter at the time of slaughter. 
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Thi s meant that the entry of fi rms who might onl y be associ ated with 
the marketing of carcase meats was limited to those firms who had 
contacts with the major processing companies. Hence, the inability of 
firms to specialise in the marketing of meat and not be involved in 
procurement from suppliers placed a potential restriction on the 
marketing performance of the entire industry. 
This discussion implies that statutory marketing arrangements 
should be carefully evaluated to determine whether such channels can be 
monitored and whether they are contestable at arm's length, if not 
directly, and whether potential agency problems exist as a result of 
these artificial barriers to entry. 
Government involvement in agricultural industries may also 
remove the incentive for producers to monitor agent behaviour. For 
example, when Supplementary Minimum Prices were being paid, there would 
not have been a great deal to be gained from monitoring prices received 
from different agents. Hence the payment of production subsidies may 
reduce efficiency in the marketing channel. 
4.5 Marketing Effort 
An analysis of incentives facing exporting firms may also give 
some indication as to the direction of marketing effort in alternative 
marketing channels. Zwart (1984), in such an analysis concluded that 
commission agents are more likely to be concerned with marketing effort 
which influences their market share or throughput. This is because it 
involves less risk from variable prices, and because the marginal 
returns from a unit increase in the final price are less than those for 
the purchasing agent. The purchasing agent, on the other hand, may be 
more concerned with marketing effort which would increase the final 
price of the product. Table 1 summarises agent responses in these 
alternative marketing channels. 
This type of analysis could be used to investigate the 
phenomenon known in New Zealand as weak selling, which refers to the 
apparent lack of marketing effort in maintaining prices in overseas 
markets. If the major effort of fi rms operati ng on commi ssi on in the 
meat industry at that time was associated with acquiring livestock to 
increase their throughput, then they may exhibit a relative lack of 
concern about maintaining price discipline in the final market. 
Where channels are contestable, and producers are able to 
monitor the performance of alternative channels, then such 'weak 
selling' could not persist, since producers could switch channels. 
This possibility would, in itself, induce commission agents to pay more 
attention to price-enhancing marketing effort. However, as noted 
previously. information distortions or non-contestable channels may 
reduce the producer's ability to monitor channel performance. 
The above discussion 
incentive structures may 
circumstances, weak selling 
similarly observed that this 
incentive structures. 
indicates how an analysis of firm 
indicate whether, and under what 
is likely to occur. Schroder (1985) 
phenomenon might be related to business 
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Table 1: Comparing the Response to Marketing Effort in Alternative 
Marketing Channels 
1. Commi ss; on Agent 2. Purchasing Agent 
Objective Function 
R = aQ + bP.Q + c R = Q{P - Pp) 
Response to Price Changes 
aR = bQ a R = Q 
aP aP 
a R - a + bP aq-
Var {£R} = 0 
ap 
Response to Quantity Changes 
a R ) 
= (P - Pp 8Q 
Risk Effects From Var(P) 
aR Var{ap}= 0 
aR Var {aq} b2 Var(P) Var{ClR}= Var(P) ClQ 
Where R is revenue, Q is the quantity of product handl ed, Pis the 
price at which product is sold, P is the purchase price, a is per unit 
commission, b represents commission charges associated with the value 
of the product (0 ~ b s 1), and c are fixed charges which may be levied 
on some other basis. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In the previous Chapters, a range of hypotheses on contractual 
evolution and agent behaviour were advanced to illustrate how 
transaction cost concepts might be useful in evaluating marketing 
channel issues. However, it must be stressed that much of this 
hypothes is i ng is quite casual, and may not stand up to more ri gorous 
empirical scrutiny. 
Transaction cost concepts focus on "incentives, risk and 
information, and the implications of these for contractual 
arrangements. For example, this type of analysis could indicate the 
extent to which an agent is likely to behave in a principal·s interest, 
how risk is allocated, and whether transaction costs in their various 
manifestations are likely to be minimised. On the basis of these 
observations, comment could be made on the relative efficiency of 
alternative marketing channels, which would give an indication of 
whether government should intervene or withdraw from activity in these 
channels. 
When applied in a positive sense, this type of analysis may be 
useful in determining why alternative contractual arrangements exist in 
different industries, and why such arrangements may be different in the 
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same industry at different periods in time. 
explaining why specific contractual forms 
situations. 
It may also assist in 
predominate in certain 
It must be noted that the various contractual arrangements 
which would be assessed could operate in unregulated markets or within 
channels controlled by statute. As such, a narrow economic application 
of these principles might not prove to be quite so fruitful when 
attempting to explain changes from non-statutory structures, or from 
minimum levels of statutory intervention to more major statutory 
measures. In such caes, non-economic linkages may need to be explored. 
As illustrated in previous Chapters, this approach also appears 
to be potentially useful in its normative context for evaluating 
channel performance with respect to efficiency issues. For example, 
the degree to which producers are able to monitor alternative channels 
has efficiency implications. Similarly, the extent to which channels 
are contestable influences the magnitude of the agency cost component 
of transaction costs, and also impinges on efficiency questions. The 
approach may also have insights to offer with respect to the relative 
direction of marketing effort in alternative marketing channels. This 
may allow comment to be made on pricing behaviour under different 
marketing options, and give limited information on the extent of 
product and market development under alternative marketing 
arrangements. 
This type of analysis may also indicate appropriate behaviour 
for government agencies. When regulatory barriers to entry exist which 
1 i mi t the contestabi 1 i ty of marketi ng channels, then government may be 
advised to remove such barriers. Similarly, when government policies 
obscure the ability of producers to monitor agent behaviour, then such 
policies may need to be reassessed. On the other hand, when it is 
difficult to monitor channel performance because performance measures 
are not independent, then Government may need to evaluate pricing 
procedures, and transmit information on relative efficiency to 
producers. 
Notwithstanding these limitations to their use, and the 
qualifications noted with respect to aspects of the scientific methods 
employed, contractual choice concepts would appear to have considerable 
potential as a framework for evaluating agricultural and horticultural 
marketing channels. Consequently, in Appendix 1, a checklist of issues 
which it would be appropriate to address in an empirical study have 
been assembled. 
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APPENIJIX 1 
A CHECKLIST FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
A1.1 Introduction 
The following checklist identifies some of the more important 
empi ri cal requi rements whi ch woul d be necessary if contractual choi ce 
concepts were to be applied to agricultural marketing channels. Such 
information could then be used in a positive sense to test a range of 
al ternati ve hypotheses on the emergence ot! ex; stence of specifi c 
contract types. In a normative sense, it c6ul d be used to eval uate 
whether mechanisms exist to discipline behaviour in alternative 
channels. 
In construct; ng thi s checkl i st, the contractual focus is 
assumed to be on the producer (the principal) and his or her agent to 
whom product is despatched. The required information is divided into 
three categories, these being market and product characteristics, 
contractual characteristics, and channel and industry characteristics. 
The listed questions are not in any order of importance, nor is it 
suggested that detailed information on all these aspects of contractual 
behaviour will be necessary in every case. 
A1.2 Product and Market Characteristics 
Is output/yield variable? 
What factors influence output/yield variability? 
To what can extent output/yield variability be attributable to 
chance (e.g. weather)? 
How familiar are producers with the crop/product? 
What alternative production opportunities are open to 
producers? 
Is the producer's initial investment in the product relatively 
high? 
What is the production cycle for the crop? 
How perishable is the product? 
Is the product supplied by the producer essentially homogeneous 
(with few grades and perhaps minimum quality standards)? 
Does output as supplied by the producer tend to be of variable 
quality? 
To what extent does the producer determine the final quality of 
the produc t? 
Can the producer distinguish between product qualities? 
When output leaves the producer, how close is it to its final 
form? 
Are there diversified end uses for the product in its final 
forms? 
How much does the producer seem to know about the final end 
uses of the product? 
Do a great number of transactions take place before the product 
finally reaches the end user? 
How much does the agent seem to know about the final end uses 
of the product? 
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Can the agent distinguish between product qualities supplied to 
him or her? 
To what extent does the agent know more about d~nand conditions 
than the producer? 
Are agents long-established operators with the product or 
market? 
Is the product relatively familiar or unfamiliar in final 
markets? 
Are there long established product outlets? 
Are quality controls in operation in final markets? 
How sensitive are markets to quality variations? 
Is there an outlet for low quality products? 
Is the product branded? 
Who are the known competitors in markets? 
To what extent are NZ producers relatively important suppliers 
to final markets? 
Are volumes which more from NZ large enough to capture 
economies of scale? 
Do product prices have a history of being variable? 
Is it possible to attribute product price variability to either 
demand or supply factors? 
AI.3 Contractual Characteristics 
Does the agent buy the product? 
Does the agent have a number of options on where to direct 
product? 
Is the agent obliged to take all product offered to him or her 
subject to minimum quality standards 
Does the agent pass product on to an auction or exchange? 
Does the agent pass product on to a final market or buyer? 
Does the agent transform the product before passing it on? 
When do property ri ghts to the product change hands? 
Does the agent operate on commission? 
Does the agent offer forward contracts? 
Does tne agent offer a range of contracts? 
How clearly does price alone signal what the agent requires? 
Are product specifications given to producers along with price? 
What are the contract details? 
Are there escape provisions in the contract? 
Is the contract standard or is it individually negotiated? 
Do contracts seem simple and robust? 
What is the duration of contracts? 
How does the duration of contracts match with production 
cycles? 
How easy is contract violation on either side? 
What type and degree of risk does the agent bear? 
What type and degree of risk does the producer bear? 
What is the agent's risk preference? 
What is the producer's risk preference? 
Is the agent specialising in contacts and price information? 
\4hat is the agent's margin? 
How easily can the agent's effort/performance be observed by 
the principal? 
Does the agent make attempts to bond to the principal? 
To what extent does the agent provide production inputs? 
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To what extent is agent behaviour in the next dyad aimed at 
increasing prices? 
To what extent is agent behaviour aimed at maximising 
throughpu t? 
Al.4 Channel and Industry Characteristics 
Wnat is the ownership structure of the agent's firm? 
Is the agent's fi rm subject to takeover? 
HOvJ important is thi s agent activity to the overall operati on 
of the agent's firm? 
How easy is monitor; ng i nformati on to come by for the 
principal? 
Is the agent likely to engage in price-enhancing activity and 
what form would this take? 
Is the agent likely to engage in volume-enhancing activity? 
To what extent is agent effort supply directed or demand 
directed? 
Can producers operate witn a range of agents? 
At the margin, what selections between channels can be made? 
Are there transaction costs associated with opening up another 
channel? 
What other channels are in operation? 
Which are most important? 
Do other agents offer the same type of contract to producers? 
Are charges or prices offered by other agents similar? 
What is the level of risk associated with alternative channels? 
What risk dispersion arrangements operate in other channels? 
Do other risk dispersion arrangements exist (e.g. third party 
insurance)? 
How easy is it to monitor performance in alternative channels? 
Are channel performance measures independent? 
Is there a hi story of frequent entry to and exi t from the 
industry by agents? 
To what extent has vertical integration occurred? 
Are there natural barriers to entering channels? 
Are there regulatory barriers to entering channels? 
Does government intervene to offer producer subsidies? 
Does government intervene to offer agent subsidies? 
Is government operating in any other way in the channel? 
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